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Throughout the history of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), the 
United States has both supported and undermined Kurdish nationalism depending upon 
changing geopolitical realities. In particular, the U.S. has sought to mollify important 
regional partners such as Turkey that possess large Kurdish populations who would 
presumably secede if the KRG were able to demonstrate the viability of an independent, 
Kurdish state. Despite its general policy of realpolitick, during the Iraq War, the U.S. 
embarked upon a period of nearly unprecedented positive support to the KRG, which 
allowed it to emerge as a major force in post-Saddam Iraq. However, the U.S. has always 
maintained the importance of a unified Iraq and has since sought to increase the level of 
economic and political parity between the KRG and other groups to achieve that 
objective.  
Who are the Kurds? 
Inhabiting northern Iraq, northeastern Syria, eastern Turkey, and western Iran, the 
Kurds are one of the largest recognized national groups that has yet to possess a state of 
its own. The mountainous geography of the area known as Greater Kurdistan has 
preserved the national identity of the Kurds in the wake of the rise of powerful nation-
states on its periphery; and it has also allowed Kurdish communities to maintain their 
unique tribal identities, a system of social organization that has disappeared or 
diminished in importance for surrounding Arabs, Persians, and Turks. Thus there are 
many different Kurdish tribal groups vying for influence and power who are are broadly 
united in their desire for the establishment of an independent Kurdistan, but often differ 
in their specific means and ideology. In the recent history of the Iraqi Kurds, this disunity 
has manifested itself in the conflict between the rural-oriented Kurdistan Democratic 
	  
Party (KDP) with its leader Masoud Barzani, and the urban-oriented Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK) with its leader Jalal Talabani. Moreover, unlike many of their 
neighbors, the Kurds speak an Indo-European language closer to Persian than Turkish or 
Arabic, and practice Sunni Islam in a region that is majority Shia. Thus the Kurds have 
maintained a unique national identity that many surrounding nation-states view with 
hostility and fear. These states have either attempted to remove the Kurds from the lands 
that they have historically inhabited or to assimilate them into the dominant national-
culture, whether it is Turk, Persian, or Arab.  
The Anfal Campaigns 
Ba'thism, the state ideology of Saddam's Iraq and Assad's Syria is rooted in the 
concept of Arab superiority or "Arab ethnic chauvinism,”1 which justifies inferior 
treatment of and discrimination against non-Arab peoples such as the Kurds. During the 
1970s to 1990s, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, inspired and justified by the ideological 
paradigm of Ba'thism, often viewed the Kurds as proxy forces for other states that wished 
to undermine his regime such as Israel, the U.S., and, most notably, Iran. In 1988, at the 
end of the Iran-Iraq War, this murderous suspicion rose to a fever pitch as Saddam 
carried out a series of forced-deportations and mass-killings of Kurds, eventually called 
the Anfal Campaigns, in order to rid himself of what he perceived to be both an Iranian 
fifth-column and an alien entity in a unified, Arab Iraq. According to internationally 
accepted estimates, the Anfal Campaigns destroyed three thousand villages, displaced 
one and half million people, and killed up to one hundred and eighty thousand.2 Even 
though the international community, and especially the United States, strongly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	   Michael Rubin, "Are Kurds a Pariah Minority?," Social Research 70, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 295-
330, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed December 1, 2013), 301. 2  Kerim Yildiz, The future of kurdistan. London: Pluto Press, 2012, 22. 
	  
condemned the attacks, it did not respond with major military or economic intervention to 
stop the killings, punish Saddam, or recommend a referendum for Kurdish independence. 
The Gulf War and the No-Fly-Zone 
In 1991, as Saddam invaded Kuwait and challenged the prevailing economic and 
political order of the Persian Gulf, the Gulf War Coalition, particularly the U.S., viewed 
the Kurds as useful allies in the struggle to restore the status-quo. In 1991, the CIA's 
Political and Personality Handbook of Iraq argued that, “The most serious ethnic split 
[within Iraq] is between the Arab majority and the Kurds," alluding to the latter's 
willingness to take up arms against the former.3 On February 15, 1991, Voice of America 
broadcast a speech by U.S. President George H.W. Bush, in which he encouraged "the 
Iraqi military [and people] to take matters into their own hands to force Saddam Hussein, 
the dictator, to step aside."4 With the expectation of American support, Kurdish 
peshmerga forces, or tribal paramilitary-units, staged a revolt in the north of Iraq while 
the majority of Saddam's troops were preoccupied engaging Coalition forces in the south 
along the Kuwaiti border. After the Coalition made the fateful decision to allow Saddam 
to remain in power, the Iraqi dictator re-deployed his forces against the Kurdish rebels 
and "up to half a million [Kurds] took refuge in Turkey, and one and a half million in 
Iran. Thousands died of cold, exposure and hunger in their flight.”5 In the wake of these 
atrocities, many Kurds believed that the U.S. had betrayed them because it did not give 
them the necessary support to secure independence from Saddam while nonetheless 
encouraging them to do so. In particular, many Kurdish leaders harshly denounced the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   CIA. Political and Personality Handbook of Iraq, January 1991, CIA Electronic Reading Room 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB167/06.pdf (accessed December 1, 2013). 
4  Kerim Yildiz, The future of kurdistan. London: Pluto Press, 2012, 42. 
5  Rubin, Michael, "Are Kurds a Pariah Minority?," Social Research 70, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 295-
330, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed December 1, 2013), 303. 
	  
decision to allow the release of prisoners-of-war from the Iraqi Republic Guard, whose 
members were known for their loyalty to Saddam and deadly combat proficiency, before 
the KRG could secure its positions from Baghdad’s inevitable military response.6  
In order to stop the bloodshed, the Coalition moved to establish a no-fly-zone 
over northern Iraq through U.N. Security Council Resolution 688. Resolution 688 
reflected a humanitarian concern for the plight of Kurds, but always did so within the 
greater context of the geopolitical interests of the U.S. and its regional allies, most 
notably Turkey. For example, the resolution expressed concern over "the repression of 
the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish-
populated areas," but emphasized that this destabilization was particularly damaging 
because of the "massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers and to 
cross-border incursions which threaten international peace and security in the region.”7 
Although the resolution recognized that "the Kurdish population, [was] suffering from 
the repression in all its forms inflicted by the Iraqi authorities,"8 it only advocated 
humanitarian aid and restraint on the part of the central government in lieu of Kurdish 
independence. However, this aid was sufficient to spark a new period in the history of the 
KRG. The Kurds of northern Iraq were now substantially protected from Saddam and 
able to begin indigenous political and economic development.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6   Rubin, Michael, "Are Kurds a Pariah Minority?," Social Research 70, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 295-
330, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed December 1, 2013), 303. 
7  United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 688, 5 April 1991, http://daccess-dds-
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(accessed December 2, 2013), 32.  8  Ibid. 
	  
Iraqi Kurdistan After the Establishment of the No-Fly-Zone 
From the declaration of the no-fly-zone in 1991 until the beginning of the Iraq 
War in 2003, the KRG underwent a period of internal conflict, development, and 
consolidation, which put it at an advantage when Saddam's government fell and power 
was available to the groups that had the ability to seize it. Isolated from the corruption 
and aggression of Saddam's government, the KRG used its thirteen-percent share of Iraq's 
oil-for-food revenues to invest in much-needed infrastructure and public institutions. 
Over time, the KRG was able to gain legitimacy amongst the Kurdish population for its 
ability to produce and sustain beneficial economic and political structures.9 As early as 
May 1992, truly democratic elections were held with the KDP obtaining 45 percent of the 
vote and the PUK obtaining 44 percent.10 However, the Kurdish government still faced 
indirect, but significant challenges from Saddam such as his denial of visas to UN 
workers whose missions were intended to help rebuild and re-develop Iraqi Kurdistan.11 
It was especially difficult for the KRG to sustain itself as it suffered the same crippling, 
economic sanctions that the U.N. levied onto Saddam’s government in Baghdad.12 
Furthermore, over time, the fractiousness that has characterized the Kurdish political 
experience arose once again in a dispute over the distribution of border-crossing 
revenues, sparking a civil-war between the KDP and the PUK from 1994 to 1998.  
In a dramatic turn of events, at the end of August 1998, Barzani and Talabani met 
in Washington, D.C. and, with mediation from the U.S. State Department, reached an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9  Vera Eccarius-Kelly, The Militant Kurds: A Dual Strategy for Freedom, Santa Barbara, Calif: 
Praeger, 2011, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost), EBSCOhost (accessed October 27, 2013), 168. 10  Michael Rubin, "Are Kurds a Pariah Minority?." Social Research 70, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 295-
330, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed December 1, 2013), 304. 11 Ibid, 308. 12 Ibid, 305.	  
	  
agreement to lay down arms. In doing so, both leaders and their respective political 
parties devoted themselves to the common cause of establishing greater autonomy for the 
KRG within Iraq.13 Significantly, this experience of national consciousness and 
consolidation allowed the KRG to organize more quickly and effectively than many non-
Kurdish groups, both before and after Saddam’s fall from power.14 Finally, the 
experience with governing that the Kurds gained from 1991 until 2003 put them in an 
excellent position to exercise influence as a political force not only within their own 
autonomous region, but also in the national parliament, or Council of Representatives.  
The Iraq War 
In 2003, during his pivotal speech to the U.N. calling for pre-emptive military 
action against Iraq, "A Policy of Evasion and Deception," U.S. Secretary of State Colin 
Powell cited the massacres of Kurds during the Anfal Campaigns as evidence of 
Saddam's maliciousness and threatening posture. Specifically, Powell said that, "Saddam 
Hussein's use of mustard and nerve gas against the Kurds in 1988 was one of the 20th 
century's most horrible atrocities."15 However, while the United States no doubt had some 
concern for the human-rights violations of Saddam’s regime, Powell argued that the 
threat that such weapons posed to the international community was the principal reason 
for the invasion, “Nothing points more clearly to Saddam Hussein's dangerous intentions 
and the threat he poses to all of us than his calculated cruelty to his own citizens and to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13 Michael M. Gunter, "The Five Stages of American Foreign Policy towards the Kurds." Insight 
Turkey 13, no. 2 (April 2011): 93-106, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed December 1, 
2013), 100. 14	  	   Gareth Stansfield, "The unravelling of the post-First World War state system? The Kurdistan 
Region of Iraq and the transformation of the Middle East," International Affairs 89, no. 2 (March 2013): 
259-282, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed December 2, 2013), 269.	  15	   Colin Powell, "A Policy of Evasion and Deception," Washington Post, February 5, 2003, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/transcripts/powelltext_020503.html (accessed November 
25, 2013).	  
	  
his neighbors.”16 Similarly to how the U.S. reacted to both the Anfal Campaigns and the 
Iraqi counterattack against the KRG in 1991, Powell denounced Saddam, but 
recommended military intervention mostly rooted in the threat to the international 
community and never mentioned supporting Kurdish independence. 
In early 2003, in exchange for working with the U.S. in the northern theater of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, the KRG was able to increase its political power significantly 
in post-Saddam Iraq. A few months before the invasion, Turkish leaders refused to allow 
the U.S. to use the country’s military bases as staging points because they were worried 
that the overthrow of Saddam would lead to the disintegration of Iraq. Turkey feared that 
this disintegration would lead to the establishment of an independent Kurdistan that 
would ally with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a prominent Kurdish terrorist-
organization operating within Turkey, and spur their own Kurdish populations, who 
occupy much of the eastern half of the country, to secede.17 Consequently, the U.S. 
contacted Kurdish leaders within the KRG for military aid from their peshmerga forces 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom. In exchange, the U.S. allowed Kurdish leaders to 
participate in conferences that shaped American developmental policies for post-Saddam 
Iraq, such as Future of Iraq Project. The PUK and KDP used the opportunity in order to 
lobby for a federal Iraqi government in which the KRG would have significant political 
and economic autonomy. Specifically, a report on the findings of the Democratic 
Principles Working Group of the Future of Iraq Project records, "representatives of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 688, 5 April 1991, http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/24/IMG/NR059624.pdf?OpenElement  
(accessed December 2, 2013), 32.	  17	   Douglas Little, "The United States and the Kurds," Journal Of Cold War Studies 12, no. 4 (Fall 
2010): 63-98, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed November 21, 2013), 96.	  
	  
PUK and the KDP spoke eloquently on the subject of federalism.”18 During the early 
days of the war, in a move that signaled its growing power, the KRG was able to occupy 
substantially more territory than it had ever held during the duration of the no-fly zone. 
The Kurds justified their occupation and seizure of these lands, especially the valuable 
city of Kirkuk, by arguing that they had been predominantly Kurdish before Saddam 
implemented his system of planned deportations and Arabization that began in the 
1970s.19 Thus, the Kurds argued that they were only reasserting control over lands that 
constituted their national territory.  
During the war, the U.S. risked alienating its regional-partner Turkey by moving 
to end its decades-old practice of conducting border raids on Kurdish positions inside 
Iraq. Prior to the Iraq War, Turkey had been able to send soldiers at will over the border 
into KRG territory, mostly to hunt down itinerant PKK forces, but also to harass the PUK 
and KDP and undermine their legitimacy among Kurdish populations in Turkey. In 2003, 
during the advance of the peshmerga forces, the U.S. military discovered that Turkish 
soldiers had crossed the border and were attempting to destabilize the KRG's rule in the 
city of Sulamaniya. As a consequence of its newly supportive position toward the KRG, 
the U.S. captured the Turkish soldiers, deported them, and, in doing so, risked a 
diplomatic incident to support its new Kurdish allies,20 which only years earlier would 
have been an unthinkable policy.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	   State Department, Future of Iraq Project, Democratic Principles Working Group - Important 
Themes 4-5, 2002, National Security Archive, George Washington University, 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB198/20020904.pdf, 3.	  19	   Vera Eccarius-Kelly, The Militant Kurds: A Dual Strategy for Freedom, Santa Barbara, Calif: 
Praeger, 2011, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost), EBSCOhost (accessed October 27, 2013), 155.	  20	  	   Michael M. Gunter, "The Five Stages of American Foreign Policy towards the Kurds." Insight 
Turkey 13, no. 2 (April 2011): 93-106. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed December 1, 
2013), 101.	  
	  
The KRG in Post-Saddam Iraq 
In 2005, during the writing of the initial Iraqi Constitution, the KRG and the Shia 
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), an alliance consisting of various Shia groups, 
influenced both the framing and execution of Iraq's new laws. This coalition was 
particularly powerful because Sunnis and many non-ISCI Shia groups decided to boycott 
the country’s first, post-invasion elections because of what they perceived to be 
disproportionate American, Kurdish, and ISCI influence.21 As an example of the Kurds’ 
newly-won privileges in the Iraqi Constitution, Article 4 reads, "The Arabic language and 
Kurdish language are the two official languages of Iraq," guaranteeing, "Speech, 
conversation and expression in official settings ... Recognition and publication of the 
official documents and correspondences in the two languages ... and Opening schools that 
teach the two languages."22 The Kurds, in securing their language as co-official with 
Arabic, won a considerable victory, especially against their rivals the Turkmen and 
Syriacs, which only have semi-official language status in "the administrative units in 
which they represent a majority of population.”23 Additionally, since the KRG had been 
organized as a semi-autonomous region since the establishment of the no-fly zone in 
1991, it was able to accede as a consistent entity during the constitutional process, 
"legislation enacted in the region of Kurdistan since 1992 shall remain in force."24 This 
measure gave the KRG certain rights and privileges that would have been more difficult 
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2012; Vol. 175, No. 4, p. 47-54; 2012-11-01): 47-54, 49.	  22	   Iraqi Constitution, The Washington Post, October 12, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html (accessed December 1, 2013).	  23	   Iraqi Constitution, The Washington Post, October 12, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html (accessed December 1, 2013).	  24	   Ibid.	  
	  
to acquire in an open, parliamentary vote and reinforced the KRG’s autonomy in the 
federal system.  
The city of Kirkuk is incredibly important to the KRG's national consciousness 
and lies on the border between areas under its own control and those under the control of 
the central government. Kirkuk is so central to Kurdish nationalists and leaders that PUK 
leader and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani has gone on record multiple times in stating that 
"Kirkuk is our Jerusalem."25 Possibly even more important than its apparent ideological 
significance, the area around Kirkuk is estimated to contain up to twenty-percent of Iraq's 
oil and natural gas reserves.26 As a further measure of its power, during the drafting of the 
2005 Constitution, the powerful KRG lobby succeeded in including Article 14, which 
called for the "normalization [or importation of Kurds and deportation of Arabs], [a] 
census and ... [a] referendum in Kirkuk [for accession to the KRG]... by a date not to 
exceed the 31st of December 2007."27 The normalization would work to correct for the 
effects of Saddam’s Arabization policies by allowing Kurds from the KRG to establish 
residency within the city with government subsidies. With the importation of Kurds into 
the city, the KRG stood poised to win the referendum and gain control of Kirkuk, a 
significant victory for both its ideological and material dimensions.  
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his supporters have argued that the Iraqi 
constitution is illegitimate because most Iraqi voters chose to boycott the political 
process, which was hijacked by a proactive minority careful in extending and guarding its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25 Kerim Yildiz.. The future of kurdistan. London; New York: Pluto Press, 2012, 74. 26 Vera Eccarius-Kelly. The Militant Kurds: A Dual Strategy for Freedom. Santa Barbara, Calif: 
Praeger, 2011. eBook Collection (EBSCOhost), EBSCOhost (accessed October 27, 2013), 154. 27 Iraqi Constitution. The Washington Post. October 12, 2005. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html (accessed December 1, 2013). 
	  
own prerogatives.28 According to this view, the constitution is a product of the turbulent, 
sectarian post-invasion period and has thus proved ineffectual in producing an 
inclusionary, equitable state. In contrast, the KRG currently expresses the view that the 
constitution was a burdensome compromise that it made in deference to the other groups 
of Iraq in order to remain part of a unified state.29 Such strong differences of opinion are 
examples of a much wider political, economic, and cultural disconnect between the KRG 
and the remainder of the country. For example, surveys conducted between 2005 and 
2010 reported that the majority of non-Kurdish Iraqis preferred continuing central-
government control of Kirkuk while ninety-eight percent of Kurds preferred the cession 
of Kirkuk to the KRG.30 In the KRG, many children who were born after the declaration 
of the no-fly zone can barely understand Arabic and have rarely left their northern 
enclave because of the ongoing, violent insurgency between the Sunni and Shia in the 
rest of Iraq. Recurring violent standoffs between the KRG and Maliki's central 
government are an outward manifestation of this fundamental divide in political and 
ideological outlook.  
The United States Reasserts its Policy of a Unified Iraq 
Despite the incredible power that the KRG wielded during this early period, the 
U.S. was still its senior partner and limited its ambitions for total independence. Years 
earlier, in 1999, the U.S. arranged a conference of experts in the fields of foreign-policy 
and military-science in order to form contingency plans in the event of a post-Saddam 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	   Gareth Stansfield and Liam Anderson, "Kurds in Iraq: The Struggle Between Baghdad and Erbil," 
Middle East Policy 16, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 134-145, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed 
November 23, 2013). 142.	  29	   Ibid.	  30	   Wladimir Wilgenburg, "Breaking from baghdad." World Affairs 175,(World Affairs, Nov 01, 
2012; Vol. 175, No. 4, p. 47-54; 2012-11-01): 47-54; 49-50. 
	  
Iraq. Again, the U.S. recognized the importance of the Kurds in creating stability within 
the region, “To this end, the United States should identify and initiate, or be prepared to 
initiate, dialogues with key leaders in the PUK, KDP, and Shia tribes as early as 
possible.”31 However, the U.S. always framed the negotiations with the Kurds with the 
belief that “Iraq should remain unified.”32 In order to balance Kurdish desires for 
independence against the objective of preserving a unified Iraq, the conference suggested, 
"that a federalist model could provide sufficient protection of Kurdish concerns to keep 
the country united.”33  
In 2007, the U.S. reasserted its realpolitik approach by ignoring the 
aforementioned deadline for a referendum on Kirkuk's accession to the KRG to appease 
and strengthen the faction of Prime Minister Maliki. Moreover, during the Surge in 2007, 
the U.S. government strengthened Baghdad’s relationships with local Sunni power 
brokers and created a larger base of support for Maliki at the cost of the Kurds’ relative 
political power.34 Finally, in December 2010, the Obama administration made a 
commitment to broker agreements between the KRG and Baghdad in exchange for the 
ratification of a new election law that forced the Kurds to give up a small number of 
proportional representatives in the Iraqi parliament.35 While the U.S. has aided the Kurds 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	   U.S. Military, Desert Crossing Seminar After Action Report, June 28-30, 1999, 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB418/docs/1%20-
%20Desert%20Crossing%20After%20Action%20Report_1999-06-28.pdf, (accessed November 20, 2013), 
12.	  32	   Ibid, 15.	  33	   Ibid, 24.	  34	   Joost R. Hiltermann, "Revenge of the Kurds," Foreign Affairs 91, no. 6 (November 2012): 16-22, 
Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed November 20, 2013).	  35 Michael M. Gunter, "The Five Stages of American Foreign Policy towards the Kurds," Insight 
Turkey 13, no. 2 (April 2011): 93-106, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed December 1, 
2013), 94. 	  
	  
more forcibly than previously, it has no plan to face the thorny foreign policy dimensions 
that an independent, Kurdish state would create.  
The Future of the KRG 
From the 1980s until the 2010s, the United States has maintained the territorial 
integrity of Iraq to ensure general regional stability and to please regional partners who 
fear the establishment of a Kurdish state from Iraq's ruins. During the Anfal Campaigns 
of the late 1980s, the Gulf War, and the Iraq War, the U.S., along with the international 
community, denounced Saddam's treatment of the Iraqi Kurds, but only intervened when 
it suited greater geopolitical interests and never promulgated a policy supporting Kurdish 
independence. Nonetheless, from the declaration of the no-fly-zone in 1991 until the Iraq 
War in 2003, the KRG were able to unify to an extent both unprecedented by Kurdish 
communities in surrounding states and by other ethnic groups within Saddam's Iraq. 
When Turkey refused to allow the U.S. to use its bases in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 
KRG leveraged its cooperation with American forces to occupy more Iraqi territory and 
to influence the formation of post-Saddam Iraq's political institutions to its own 
advantage. Although its level of support to the KRG has increased, the U.S. has remained 
resolutely committed to a unified Iraq and has actively strengthened the government of 
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to offset the increasingly powerful KRG.  
As years pass, the two sides are only becoming more divergent in their 
understanding of a federal Iraq and are losing their ability to consider each other as 
citizens of the same country. While the U.S. will no doubt support its traditional policy of 
maintaining a "unified Iraq," doing so will become increasingly difficult and fraught with 
the risk of violent civil war between Baghdad and the KRG. Finally, as the increasingly 
	  
sovereign Kurdish population in Syria slowly secures its own independence, it will 
undoubtedly look to the KRG both as a model to be imitated and possibly as a partner in 
the creation of a pan-Kurdish state.  
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